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The Waiting Game: How States Can 
Solve the Organ-Donation Crisis 
 
Thousands of patients in the United States live in limbo every 
day waiting for a lifesaving organ transplant, and the gap between the 
number of people who need a transplant and the number of available 
organs widens every year. Every state currently allows individuals to 
unilaterally indicate their intent to donate their organs upon death, but 
in practice, family members are frequently allowed to override the 
express intentions of decedents. In addition, the current U.S. “opt-in” 
system fails to reach its full potential because many eligible decedents 
never express their desires to become or not to become organ donors, and 
family members refuse to consent to donation or cannot be contacted in 
time. This Note argues that states should again take the lead in organ-
donation regulation to solve the organ-shortage crisis and proposes a 
twofold solution for states to adopt. First, states should switch to a 
presumed-consent, or opt-out, model. Second, states should implement a 
monitoring and enforcement mechanism through which state attorneys 
general and state health departments enforce first-person authorization. 
Organ procurement organizations should be required to adopt bylaws 
requiring their strict compliance with decedents’ wishes, and a failure to 
do so would give state attorneys general grounds to sue for breach of 
501(c)(3) status obligations. The result would be to increase the supply 
of viable organs for transplant by interpreting an individual’s failure to 
opt out as a desire to donate and to enforce this choice by not allowing 
anyone to override it.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“We prayed for a miracle that Curtis would be okay, but when 
we knew that wasn’t going to happen, we prayed that he could be a 
miracle for someone else.”1 Twenty-nine years ago, Curtis Gano, a 
sixteen-year-old boy, was riding his bike when a van struck him, leaving 
him brain dead.2 His parents did not want his memory to end there, so 
they donated his organs and saved four other lives.3 The family had 
watched a documentary on organ and tissue donation years earlier and 
knew the impact it would have on other families.4  
The stories of organ donees, such as Curtis’s beneficiaries, may 
begin long before they get sick, before they are put on the transplant 
 
 1. Donor Dad Reaches 200,000 Students with His Story, GIFT LIFE DONOR PROGRAM (June 
6, 2018), https://www.donors1.org/cherry-hill-nj-resident-reaches-200000-students-with-life-
saving-message-2 [https://perma.cc/9L7R-TSLQ]. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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list, and maybe even before they are born. Their stories begin when a 
teenager checks “yes” to organ donation at the DMV, when an older man 
registers to be an organ donor after meeting the donee of an organ 
transplant, or when a family like the Ganos is struck by tragedy and 
consents to having its child’s organs donated. The stories of the 28,587 
people5 saved by deceased donors in 2017 started when someone was 
placed in a similar situation. 
Every day in the United States, twenty people on the organ-
transplant list have their stories cut short while waiting for an 
available organ.6 This tragedy is not due to the lack of a cure or even a 
lack of resources. Although transplant technology has drastically 
improved over the last twenty years, the number of transplants 
performed each year has not increased. The organ-donation process in 
the United States is at a standstill: with deceased-donor transplant 
operations hovering between twenty-eight and twenty-nine thousand 
annually in recent years,7 approximately 114,000 people remain 
waiting for an organ in 2019.8 Current legislation and policies fail to 
address this public health crisis, which only continues to balloon.9 
States led the drive to regulate and promote organ donation at its 
inception10 but have since retreated and now fail to effectively monitor 
and enforce their organ-donation laws.  
This Note analyzes the shortcomings of the legal framework for 
organ donation in the United States and demonstrates that the lack of 
state regulation and enforcement is at the heart of the problem. Part I 
provides background information and a brief history of the U.S. organ-
donation process. Part II discusses why organ donation has not reached 
its full potential in the United States and the failures of the present 
legal framework. Part III proposes a twofold solution: switching to a 
presumed-consent model and creating a monitoring and enforcement 
mechanism for states. The Conclusion reiterates the importance of 
 
 5. Deceased Organ Donors in United States Exceeded 10,000 for First Time in 2017, UNOS 
(Jan. 9, 2018), https://unos.org/deceased-organ-donors-in-united-states-exceeded-10000-for-first-
time-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/9PKW-KRCE] [hereinafter Donors Exceeded 10,000]. 
 6. Transplant Trends, UNOS, https://unos.org/data/transplant-trends/ (last visited Feb. 25, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/4EM7-WRJB]. 
 7. Sally Satel & David C. Cronin II, Time to Test Incentives to Increase Organ Donation, 175 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1329, 1329 (2015).  
 8. Transplant Trends, supra note 6. 
 9. From 1988 to 2011, the supply of transplantable organs grew by 140 percent, while the 
number of individuals waiting for a transplant grew by 650 percent. Adelin Levin, The Impact of 
First-Person Consent Legislation on the Supply of Deceased Organ Donors 2 (Apr. 26, 2014) 
(unpublished B.A. thesis, Grand Valley State University), https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1302&context=honorsprojects [https://perma.cc/NF8A-6HLG].  
 10. States started enacting their own organ-donation regulations in the 1960s, whereas the 
federal government did not enact any legislation on the issue until 1984. See infra Section I.B.  
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states in reclaiming their authority to regulate and enforce organ-
donation processes within their jurisdictions.  
I. THE NETWORK OF ORGAN-DONATION REGULATION 
In 1954, Dr. Joseph Murray, a Boston surgeon, performed the 
first successful kidney transplant.11 Surgeons had been researching and 
experimenting with organ and tissue transplantation since the 
eighteenth century, but Dr. Murray’s operation—transferring a kidney 
from a living donor to his identical twin brother—was the first to extend 
a donee’s life for a substantial period.12 In 1962, Dr. Murray performed 
the first successful deceased-donor kidney transplant, and before the 
decade’s end, various other surgeons had performed the first successful 
liver, lung, pancreas, and heart transplants, prompting the emergence 
of transplant centers across the United States and Europe.13  
This Part begins by detailing the logistics of today’s lifesaving 
organ-donation process. It then proceeds to detail the current U.S. 
regulatory framework for the organ-transplantation process—
discussing state law and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Acts in Section 
I.B and the applicable federal regulations in Section I.C.  
A. The Donation Process 
A patient in need of an organ transplant is trapped in a waiting 
game until she receives the phone call that a donor has matched. An 
organ procurement organization (“OPO”), the cornerstone of the organ-
donation process,14 is responsible for delivering the good news. OPOs 
are regional, private nonprofit organizations incorporated under state 
law that work with organ-transplant facilities and qualifying hospitals 
to arrange for the acquisition and preservation of donated organs and 
allocate them to patients on the waiting list.15 OPOs started developing 
in the 1960s and were initially intended to each serve the transplant 
program at just one hospital, but they gradually expanded to serve 
multiple transplant programs in a given geographical region.16 The 
 
 11. Richard J. Howard et al., History of Deceased Organ Donation, Transplantation, and 
Organ Procurement Organizations, 22 PROGRESS TRANSPLANTATION 6, 7 (2012).  
 12. Id. The donee survived another eight years, and the donor another fifty-six years. 
Dr. Murray was awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1990 for his work in transplantation. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. DAVID L. KASERMAN & A.H. BARNETT, THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A 
PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM 13 (2002). 
 15. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13; Howard et al., supra note 11, at 10, 14. 
 16. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 140 n.20; Howard et al., supra note 11, at 10, 
14. 
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United States now has fifty-eight OPOs, which serve 248 transplant 
centers across the country. Each OPO covers a specific geographic 
region assigned by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) and is responsible for coordinating donations and allocations 
within that region and occasionally across the country.17 
From their inception, OPOs served as the connection between 
transplant centers and donor hospitals.18 The Division of Organ 
Transplantation, an administrative unit under HHS, tasks OPOs to 
work closely with organ-transplant facilities in their respective regions 
to identify potential donors, conduct systematic efforts to acquire all 
usable organs, ensure compliance with standards adopted by the Organ 
Procurement and Transplantation Network (“OPTN”), and increase 
public outreach through community awareness.19 Hospitals enter into 
contracts with their designated OPO to coordinate the procurement and 
use of organs as anatomical gifts.20 
The OPO assigned to the donor’s hospital becomes involved 
when the donor is declared medically and legally brain dead.21 Under 
federal regulations, every hospital must notify its local OPO of patients 
who have died or are nearing death so the OPO can start planning for 
a potential organ transplantation.22 Despite this initial notice, a patient 
will not be evaluated for organ donation until doctors have taken all 
lifesaving measures.23 Once a hospital notifies an OPO of a potential 
donor’s death, it must make “a reasonable search of the records of the 
Department of Public Safety and any donor registry that it knows exists 
 
 17. Howard et al., supra note 11, at 14. The number of OPOs has fluctuated, with over 128 
in 1986, many of which were in the same city and competed for hospital contracts and potential 
donors. Id. OPOs have since consolidated and been assigned exclusive geographic collections 
regions. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13. Many smaller OPOs were not economically 
viable and recovered too few organs, so they eventually merged with larger OPOs to improve 
effectiveness. Howard et al., supra note 11, at 14. To remain solvent, OPOs often competed for 
hospital contracts with one another. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13. Because each 
OPO is now exclusively entitled to a specific geographic region, competition no longer exists among 
OPOs for organs or to outperform each other. 
 18. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13; Howard et al., supra note 11, at 14.  
 19. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13; Howard et al., supra note 11, at 14. 
 20. Gerry W. Beyer, Controlling Body Disposition: The Law and the Macabre 7 (Oct. 31, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2862112 
[https://perma.cc/NTR6-BLAU]. 
 21. See infra Section I.A. Donors are those patients who are brain dead but still have healthy, 
functioning organs suitable for transplantation.  
 22. 42 C.F.R. § 482.45(a)(1) (2018); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Deceased 
Donation Process, ORGANDONOR.GOV, https://organdonor.gov/about/process/deceased-
donation.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/WJ4W-BV32] [hereinafter The 
Deceased Donation Process].  
 23. Donation Process, CTR. FOR ORGAN RECOVERY & EDUC., https://www.core.org/ 
understanding-donation/donation-process/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XM8T-
J2ZR].  
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for the geographical area in which the individual resides”24 and must 
reasonably “search for any person . . . having priority to make an 
anatomical gift on behalf of a prospective donor.”25 If the decedent has 
already indicated her intent to donate, such as on a driver’s license, the 
OPO does not have to seek consent from a person with priority.26 
If the decedent is a registered donor, the registration serves as 
legal authorization for a transplantation team to procure the organs for 
donation (“first-person authorization”).27 If the decedent is not 
registered, the OPO will ask the decedent’s next of kin for authorization 
to remove and use the organs for donation.28  
Once authorization is received, hospital personnel enter the 
donor’s medical characteristics into the United Network for Organ 
Sharing (“UNOS”), a national database of all patients awaiting a 
transplant, which then matches each organ with the best potential 
donee.29 The OPTN, a nonprofit organization under contract with the 
federal government, administers UNOS.30 Recipients of the organs are 
usually located proximate to the donor, but UNOS can also share them 
with waiting patients in other regions.31 While the matching process is 
underway, the donor’s organs are kept on artificial support and closely 
monitored.32 A transplant-surgical team supplants the medical team 
that was treating the patient before death,33 as medical personnel 
trying to save the patient’s life can never be involved with the 
 
 24. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 692A.014(a) (West 2017).  
 25. Id. § 692A.014(g). This Texas law is one example of a state statute adopting the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act (“UAGA”). Other states have similar provisions.  
26. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 9 cmt. (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 
2009). A person with priority is authorized to make an anatomical gift of a decedent’s organs, and 
the order of priority for whose permission is sought is outlined in section 9 of the latest version of 
the UAGA (“2006 Revised Act”). Id. Many OPOs, however, still will seek consent from a person 
with priority, even when the decedent has made her intentions clear, and will follow the wishes of 
the family member instead of the express wishes of the patient. See infra Section II.C. 
 27. Organ Donation Process, LIFEGIFT, http://www.lifegift.org/organ-donation-process (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9ZGP-VRFL]; The Deceased Donation Process, supra note 
22. 
 28. The Deceased Donation Process, supra note 22.  
 29. Id.  
 30.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Glossary of Organ Donation Terms, 
ORGANDONOR.GOV, https://www.organdonor.gov/about/facts-terms/terms.html (last visited Jan. 
12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/S44R-6QN7]. 
 31. The Deceased Donation Process, supra note 22.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
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transplant process.34 The donor’s organs are removed in an operating 
room and taken to the donee by air or ambulance.35  
B. State Law and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Acts 
The development of organ-transplant technology provoked 
legislation to regulate these groundbreaking procedures. State law 
governs most of the substantive standards, rights, and obligations of 
hospitals and OPOs, including donor registration, public education, 
declaration of brain death, and authorization to donate.36 States took 
action to regulate and control the organ-donation process in the 1960s,37 
long before the federal government enacted its first legislation on the 
matter in 1984. In 1968, the Uniform Legal Commission (“ULC”)38 
issued the first Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (“UAGA”) to promote 
uniformity among states and simplify the organ-transplantation 
process in order to increase the number of cadaveric donors.39 States 
could and did adopt the UAGA as their own legislation.40 Organ 
transplantation is time sensitive and involves coordination among 
states, especially when donors and donees are located in different 
states.41 Thus, having uniform laws across cooperating states is 
imperative to procuring and allocating organs efficiently as they become 
available.42  
 
 34. Donation Process, supra note 23; The Deceased Donation Process, supra note 22. Medical 
personnel responsible for attempting to save the patient’s life must be separate from the transplant 
team to avoid real or perceived conflicts of interest.  
 35. The Deceased Donation Process, supra note 22.  
 36. Sam Crowe & Eric Cohen, Organ Transplantation Policies and Policy Reforms, 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (2006), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps92649/ 
organ_donation.html [https://perma.cc/Z87Q-NRNQ]. Federal law prescribes standards for OPO 
certification, outcome requirements, and process performance measures. See 42 C.F.R.  
§§ 486.303–.360 (2018). 
37. See COMM. ON ISSUES IN ORGAN DONOR INTERVENTION RESEARCH, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., 
ENG’G & MED., OPPORTUNITIES FOR ORGAN DONOR INTERVENTION RESEARCH 73 (2017), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK470922/ [https://perma.cc/8U8T-UC9V] (explaining that 
“states began enacting organ donation and procurement legislation in the 1960s when organ 
transplantation became a viable medical procedure”).  
 38. The ULC, also known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, reviews and studies state laws, determines which areas of law should be uniform among the 
fifty states and District of Columbia, and proposes model legislation for state legislatures to adopt. 
Overview, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/AF58-RBYM].  
 39. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 11.  
40. Id.  
 41. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 4).  
 42. Id.  
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The UAGA was amended in 1987 specifically to prioritize, for the 
first time, a donor’s wishes above those of her family,43 but it did not 
strictly prohibit seeking familial consent before procuring organs, as 
was the general practice.44 Only twenty-six states, however, adopted 
the 1987 UAGA.45 While some attributed the lack of widespread 
acceptance to the small number of significant changes, others blamed 
the provision permitting coroners and medical examiners to make 
anatomical gifts if no family could be found and a contrary intention 
was not known (“presumed consent”).46 The UAGA was again amended 
in 2006 (“2006 Revised Act”) and subsequently adopted by forty-six 
states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.47 It 
currently serves as the model act for state regulation of the organ-
donation process in hospitals nationwide.48 The 2006 Revised Act 
reaffirmed the importance of first-person authorization and maintained 
a good faith affirmative defense for transplantation professionals, both 
discussed below in more detail.  
Emerging state laws on the topic ignited debate over when a 
potential donor should be pronounced medically and legally dead and 
when it becomes ethically acceptable to procure that person’s organs for 
transplantation.49 In 1981, the ULC adopted the Uniform 
Determination of Death Act (“UDDA”), which defines death as the 
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or the 
 
 43. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987), amended by 
REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009); id. § 2(h) (“An 
anatomical gift that is not revoked by the donor before death is irrevocable and does not require 
the consent or concurrence of any person after the donor’s death.”).  
 44. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 4).  
 45. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note. 
 46. Daphne D. Sipes, Legislative Update on the State Adoption of the 1987 Revision to the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968, 4 BYU J. PUB. L. 395, 426–28, 435 (1990). This provision 
was modeled after states’ presumed-consent statutes for corneas, eye tissue, and occasionally 
organs. See infra Section I.B.3.  
47. Anatomical Gift Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/ 
community-home?CommunityKey=015e18ad-4806-4dff-b011-8e1ebc0d1d0f (last visited Jan. 13, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/F3SE-FJBP]. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Howard et al., supra note 11, at 9. For example, states typically chose one of four common 
models to follow when they enacted brain-death laws in the 1970s: the Kansas model, providing 
alternative means for determining death; the Capron-Kass model, where death is pronounced 
while heart and lung functions are artificially maintained; the American Bar Association model, 
where irreversible cessation of total brain function equals death; or the Uniform Brain Death 
model, which is similar to American Bar Association model but emphasizes irreversible cessation 
of brain stem function. Frank P. Stuart et al., Brain Death Laws and Patterns of Consent to Remove 
Organs for Transplantation from Cadavers in the United States and 28 Other Countries, 31 
TRANSPLANTATION 238, 242 (1981). 
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cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.50 
All fifty states and the District of Columbia adopted the UDDA, but 
guidelines on how to determine brain death as defined in the UDDA 
currently vary among states and between hospitals.51  
1. First-Person Authorization 
The 2006 Revised Act significantly relaxed the process for 
becoming an organ donor; individuals are now empowered to consent 
either by signing a donor card or other official document—such as a 
driver’s license application—or by enrolling in a donor registry.52 Each 
of the fifty states and the District of Columbia currently operates its 
own online donor-consent registry that allows hospitals and OPOs to 
check donor status.53 Additionally, fifty-seven of fifty-eight OPOs 
operate online registries that enable individuals to register online as 
organ donors.54  
The 2006 Revised Act stresses the importance of donor 
autonomy, dedicating an entire section to the preclusive effects of 
registering as an organ donor.55 It requires hospitals and OPOs to honor 
a decedent’s express wishes and to ignore family members’ attempts to 
override the donor’s decision.56 Under section 8(a), “[I]n the absence of 
 
 50. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980); Howard et al., supra 
note 11, at 9. 
 51. Howard et al., supra note 11, at 9. For example:  
In some states, 1 physician is required to pronounce brain death, whereas in other 
states 2 physicians are needed. Furthermore, in some states 2 declarations of brain 
death have to be separated in time, but in others both declarations can be made at the 
same time. Some states specify which physicians can diagnose brain death; others do 
not. Thus, currently an individual can be pronounced dead in 1 state but be considered 
alive in the state next door. . . . [G]uidelines for determination of brain death vary 
considerably among US hospitals.  
Id. at 9–10. In Texas, a registered nurse or physician’s assistant can declare a patient brain dead 
if allowed by the hospital’s written policy, unless the patient is on life support. What Is the Uniform 
Declaration of Death Act (UDDA)?, FINDLAW, https://healthcare.findlaw.com/patient-rights/what-
is-the-uniform-declaration-of-death-act-or-udda.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
X4XY-YC8U]. 
 52. W.J. Chon et al., When the Living and the Deceased Cannot Agree on Organ Donation: A 
Survey of US Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs), 14 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 172, 173 
(2014).  
53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 172. 
 55. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8 (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009).  
 56. The 1987 Act stated in a one-sentence provision that “[a]n anatomical gift that is not 
revoked by the donor before death is irrevocable and does not require the consent . . . of any person 
after the donor’s death.” UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987), amended 
by REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT. The drafters of the 2006 Revised Act purposefully 
expanded the provision to draw attention to it and reinforce its intent. Beyer, supra note 20 
(manuscript at 6). 
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an express, contrary indication by the donor, a person other than the 
donor is barred from making, amending, or revoking an anatomical gift 
of a donor’s body or part if the donor made an anatomical gift of the 
donor’s body or part.”57 This addition, known as first-person 
authorization or first-person consent, forbids families from overriding a 
decedent’s explicit donation of her organs; doctors and hospital 
personnel are thus required to follow the decedent’s directive, not the 
wishes of the family.58  
First-person authorization was not a groundbreaking concept 
when it was included as part of the 2006 Revised Act. States began 
enacting first-person-authorization laws in 199459 “based on the 
principle that a decision by a person with decision-making capacity 
should be respected even after he or she dies.”60 These laws are widely 
supported by empirical evidence that concludes that knowledge of a 
patient’s wishes regarding organ donation both aids families in making 
their decisions and increases the likelihood they will authorize organ 
donation and be satisfied with their final decisions.61 By 2006, nineteen 
states had first-person-authorization laws in place,62 and currently all 
fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted first-person-
authorization laws.63 The transplant community largely supports this 
concept, but doctors and OPOs do not always follow it when the next of 
kin opposes donation.64  
The disparity between general favor for organ donation and 
consent rates has historically been and continues to be high.65 Ninety-
five percent of U.S. adults approve of organ donation, yet only fifty-four 
percent are registered organ donors.66 First-person-authorization 
legislation is designed to narrow this gap by ensuring that survivors 
follow decedents’ wishes whenever they are documented.67 Eliminating 
the need for familial consent increases the conversion rate—the rate at 
 
 57. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(a).  
 58. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 172–73.  
 59. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 7).  
 60. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 172.  
 61. Heather M. Traino & Laura A. Siminoff, Attitudes and Acceptance of First Person 
Authorization: A National Comparison of Donor and Nondonor Families, 74 J. TRAUMA & ACUTE 
CARE SURGERY 294, 299 (2012).  
 62. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 7).  
 63. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 173.  
 64. Id. at 175. 
 65. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 3).  
 66. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Organ Donation Statistics, ORGANDONOR.GOV, 
https://organdonor.gov/statistics-stories/statistics.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/4C2C-662E] [hereinafter Organ Donation Statistics].  
 67. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 3).  
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which eligible donors68 are “converted” into actual donors—because 
families, at least theoretically, cannot override the wishes of decedents 
who have indicated a preference to donate.69 Thus, introducing first-
person authorization increases the number of actual deceased organ 
donors because there is a higher likelihood that the donor’s wish to 
donate, as opposed to the donor’s family’s wishes against donation, is 
respected.70 
2. Good Faith Defense 
Under both the original UAGA and the 2006 Revised Act, doctors 
and hospital personnel may assert an affirmative defense of good 
faith.71 The good faith defense removes criminal and civil liability when 
doctors and other hospital personnel violate the UAGA but do so while 
attempting in good faith to act in accordance with the UAGA.72 “The 
good-faith immunity provision . . . does not require strict compliance 
with the [UAGA]’s procedures for obtaining and conveying donative 
consent; rather, it immunizes good-faith efforts to comply with its 
mandatory procedures.”73 The widely accepted definition and objective 
standard adopted is “an honest belief, the absence of malice and the 
absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.”74 
Courts have traditionally interpreted the defense’s coverage 
extremely broadly, effectively protecting the medical community.75 For 
example, courts found the good faith defense dispositive when a 
hospital worker mistakenly harvested bones from a decedent whose 
family had specifically refused consent76 and when an eye bank 
harvested corneas from a deceased patient when doctors misread the 
consent form and mistakenly thought the family had authorized eye 
 
 68. Eligible donors are those patients who have been declared medically brain dead and do 
not have any organs with major diseases or infections. See 42 C.F.R. § 486.302 (2018).  
 69. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 5).  
 70. Id. 
 71. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
amended 2009); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4(a) (1968) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1987).  
 72. Beyer, supra note 20 (manuscript at 7).  
 73. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 91 (2013). 
 74. See Sattler v. Nw. Tissue Ctr., 42 P.3d 440, 443 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc., 519 N.Y.S.2d 928, 
930 (Sup. Ct. 1987)) (tracking the creation of the definition by a New York court and subsequent 
adoption by a federal district court and state courts in Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Alabama). 
 75. Leonard H. Bucklin, Woe unto Those Who Request Consent: Ethical and Legal 
Considerations in Rejecting a Deceased’s Anatomical Gift Because There Is No Consent by the 
Survivors, 78 N.D. L. REV. 323, 334–35 (2002).  
 76. Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 662 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). 
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donation.77 The public policy rationale behind the defense is to 
encourage medical personnel to move forward with donation and 
transplantation operations without fear of subsequent liability.78 
Courts consider this rationale when determining whether defendants 
may successfully invoke the defense.79 Transplant professionals have 
only asserted the defense in actions brought by a donor’s family, as 
there are no plaintiffs to sue on behalf of patients on the waiting list to 
enforce compliance with first-person authorization.80 Thus, transplant 
professionals have never had the need to assert the defense in a suit 
brought by a decedent’s estate for failing to retrieve and donate organs 
when she registered as a donor but the OPO allowed her family to 
override her decision.  
3. A Failed State-Driven Presumed-Consent Model 
More than two-thirds of states previously experimented with 
presumed-consent statutes, beginning in the late 1960s. These statutes 
allowed for the retrieval of corneas and other eye tissues, pituitary 
glands, and occasionally organs from deceased individuals in coroners’ 
or medical examiners’ custody.81 The rationale behind presumed 
consent was that donating an eye tissue or, in rare circumstances, an 
organ was no more invasive than a full autopsy, and therefore no 
additional rights were infringed.82 Coroners and medical examiners 
could only proceed with the retrieval if they were unaware of any 
objections by the individuals or family members.83 As discussed 
previously, the 1987 UAGA reinforced presumed-consent statutes by 
recommending provisions for the donation of any organ or tissue from 
cadavers in coroners’ and medical examiners’ custody when certain 
 
 77. Lyon v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 531, 536 (D. Minn. 1994).  
 78. See Bucklin, supra note 75, at 336 (citing Williams v. Hofmann, 223 N.W.2d 844, 848–49 
(Wis. 1974)). 
 79. See Sattler, 42 P.3d at 443 (“Affording the good faith defense to procurement 
organizations effectuates the Legislature’s intent. Without the protection from liability provided 
by the good faith defense, procurement organizations would likely hesitate to seek needed 
donations.”); Williams, 223 N.W.2d at 848–49 (stating that “limitation on liability contained in 
[section 7(c) of the UAGA of 1968] . . . is justified by the legitimate public purpose of encouraging 
doctors to participate in the removal of organs following death, and therefore increasing their 
supply”).  
 80. See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 45–50, 147 n.20 (concluding that violations 
of first-person authorization have gone unpunished because there is no plaintiff to enforce 
compliance).  
 81. David Orentlicher, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: Its Rise and Fall in the United 
States, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 295, 299 (2009).  
 82. Id. at 299–300.  
 83. Id. at 300.  
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prerequisites were met.84 After implementation, numerous state courts 
found no violation of individual rights when individual plaintiffs 
challenged the statutes.85  
Two federal appellate court decisions, however, triggered the 
movement to repeal presumed-consent legislation.86 In Brotherton v. 
Cleveland,87 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit “recognized 
a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process right for family 
members” when the coroner took the corneas of the plaintiff’s spouse 
after hospital personnel had specifically documented her objection in 
the medical record.88 The coroner had a policy “not to obtain a next of 
kin’s consent or to inspect the medical records or hospital documents 
before removing corneas.”89 The Sixth Circuit never decided what level 
of process was due to the plaintiff; only that “some process was due to 
her before the corneas could be taken.”90  
The Ninth Circuit recognized in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran91 
that “family members may claim property rights in the body of a 
deceased person” and some level of process is due to the family before 
removing a decedent’s corneas.92 In Newman, the coroner—who made 
approximately $250,000 per year from selling corneas to a for-profit 
tissue bank—made every effort to avoid speaking with the family to 
ensure he would not learn about any objections.93 Soon after, a trend 
toward abandoning presumed consent emerged, and the 2006 Revised 
Act essentially eliminated the 1987 provision encouraging it.94 All but 
 
84. Id.; supra note 46 and accompanying text. The 2006 Revised Act similarly allows “any 
other person having the authority to dispose of the decedent’s body” (which is often a coroner or 
medical examiner) to make an anatomical gift after a reasonable search for family members and 
no knowledge of refusal or objection. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 9(a)(10) & cmt. (2006) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009). But the commentary states that “in that case it is most 
unlikely that the decedent’s organs could be donated as they are not likely to be medically suitable 
for transplantation or therapy given the amount of time that likely will pass before it can be 
determined that no one else will claim the body.” Id. § 9 cmt. Of course, states could have adopted 
the UAGA without including coroners or medical examiners as persons authorized to dispose of 
bodies. 
 85. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 300. 
 86. Id. at 305–08.  
 87. 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 88. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 306. 
 89. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 478.  
 90. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 306. 
 91. 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 92. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 307. 
 93. Id. at 306. 
 94. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 9 cmt. (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 
2009); see supra note 84.  
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a few states repealed their presumed-consent laws, and those who 
retained them mainly did so for cornea procurement only.95  
C. Federal Regulation 
Federal law prescribes standards for the procurement, 
allocation, and transplantation of organs; it governs everything that 
happens to the decedent and donee once the decedent’s donor status is 
confirmed. In 1984, the National Organ Transplant Act (“NOTA”) 
created the Division of Organ Transplantation to oversee the OPTN and 
Scientific Registry and to assert federal regulation over OPOs and 
UNOS by exercising its rulemaking authority.96 The OPTN organizes a 
national listing of transplant candidates, and the Scientific Registry 
tracks records of organ donees. OPOs and UNOS predate NOTA, having 
developed as hospitals and regions gradually cooperated and shared 
organs. It was necessary for OPOs to produce a uniform list of waiting 
patients through UNOS to allocate organs as they became available, 
because the market of donors and donees expanded and hospitals 
within a given region needed to share information fluidly with each 
other and their designated OPO.97 Scholars debate how Congress 
envisioned the execution of a federal system of transplant regulation 
under NOTA.98 The public policy underlying NOTA, however, has never 
been seriously questioned or evaluated; it is merely a de facto adoption 
of the policy that justified the system as it existed in 1984.99 The federal 
 
 95. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 36-2-14-19 (2018) (allowing coroners and medical examiners to 
remove corneas for transplant when they have attempted to contact individuals authorized to 
make or refuse such a donation and do not know of any objection to the removal and donation of 
the decedent’s corneas); WIS. STAT. § 157.06 (2018) (allowing coroners and medical examiners to 
retrieve organs when there is no evidence of either making or refusing an anatomical gift and 
every reasonable effort has been made to locate individuals who would be authorized to make or 
refuse an anatomical gift on behalf of the decedent); see also Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 307–
08.  
 96. Howard et al., supra note 11, at 11. 
 97. Id.  
 98. See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 8 (noting that Congress passed NOTA in 
response to a Virginia physician attempting to alleviate the organ shortage by brokering living-
donor kidneys); James F. Blumstein, Government’s Role in Organ Transplantation Policy, 14 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 5, 22 (1989) (arguing NOTA had “distinct elements of a market-perfecting 
orientation . . . compatible with a pluralistic, decentralized, voluntary system” and the resulting 
network was much more centralized and uniform than intended by drafters); Frank A. Sloan et 
al., Is There a Rationale for Regionalizing Organ Transplantation Services?, 14 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 115, 128–34 (1989) (arguing that Congress sought to establish a national procurement 
and distribution system but was unsuccessful because allocation remains in the hands of local and 
regional networks).  
 99. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 8.  
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Act solidified the system of altruistic donation100 and established the 
OPTN and Scientific Registry.101 
UNOS oversees the national registry of potential donors and the 
waiting list of potential donees.102 In 1969, the South-Eastern Organ 
Procurement Foundation (“SEOPF”), an independent nonprofit 
organization serving eight transplant centers in four states and the 
District of Columbia, developed under federal contract a computer 
system to create an organ-procurement and sharing network.103 Many 
transplant centers outside of SEOPF’s region sought to use the 
computer system, and in 1977, it was officially named the United 
Network for Organ Sharing and became the national computer system 
for registering transplant candidates and sharing organs across the 
country.104 Before NOTA’s passage in 1984, some regional sharing 
occurred outside of states and OPOs that matched using UNOS, but 
NOTA required that all transplant candidates be listed on UNOS and 
only permitted organ sharing through the OPTN.105 
In response to a widening gap between donor-eligible deaths and 
successful donations, HHS adopted two significant recommendations in 
its 1998 final rule: (1) routine referral and (2) required request.106 
Routine referral requires hospital personnel to refer all deaths that 
occur in the hospital to its OPO.107 Required request obliges hospital 
personnel to discuss the possibility of organ donation with surviving 
family members, giving every family the opportunity to donate their 
family member’s organs.108 Despite this federal mandate, a study 
analyzing data on organ-donation consent rates between 2008 and 2011 
 
 100. By codifying the contemporary system of altruistic donation, Congress prevented the 
possible formation of any market system for organ donation. See id. at 51–54 (arguing for the 
creation of a market system in the United States).  
 101. Id. at 12. 
 102. Id. at 13. 
 103. Howard et al., supra note 11, at 11. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 42 C.F.R. §§ 486.324, .342 (2018); Identification of Potential Organ, Tissue, and Eye 
Donors, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,856, 33,869–70 (June 22, 1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 482). The 
1987 UAGA, an update of the original 1968 model statute, included another requirement, called 
routine inquiry. Routine inquiry requires hospital personnel to ask patients upon admittance if 
they would consider being organ donors, so the donative intention of every patient who enters the 
hospital is known. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987), amended by 
REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009). But only 
twenty-four states adopted the 1987 UAGA. Crowe & Cohen, supra note 36. HHS did not include 
the routine-inquiry requirement in any regulation, but 42 C.F.R. § 486.324(b)(12) gives OPO 
boards the authority to recommend policies to assist “hospitals in establishing and implementing 
protocols for making routine inquiries about organ donations by potential donors.” The 2006 
Revised Act also does not include this requirement, but it is unclear why.  
107. Identification of Potential Organ, Tissue, and Eye Donors, 63 Fed. Reg. at 33,870.  
 108. 42 C.F.R. § 486.342(a).  
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found that in three percent of cases (1,080 deaths), eligible donors’ 
families were not asked to donate the decedent’s organs.109 Even when 
physicians did discuss organ donation with families, they refused to 
consent in forty-six to fifty percent of cases.110 In theory, routine referral 
and required request should have a significant impact on the number 
of donors, but in practice, there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure 
hospitals are following protocol.  
II. UNENFORCED RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Gift law governs organ donations and creates a binding contract 
between the donor and the respective OPO: the donor intends to have 
her organs donated for transplantation (or other specified purposes) 
upon her death, and the OPO will follow her wishes if medically 
possible.111 All three elements of an executed gift are present: donative 
intent, transfer or delivery, and acceptance.112 When an OPO concedes 
to family objections and refuses to procure the decedent’s organs, that 
legally binding promise is compromised, which violates both the 2006 
Revised Act’s first-person-authorization provision and common law gift 
law.113 This Part first presents the two areas of law currently governing 
organ transplantation and then explains why hospitals and OPOs 
continue to degrade first-person authorization without repercussion. It 
concludes by positing that OPOs, as private, nonprofit actors, must be 
held to the same standards as other nonprofits and risk losing tax-
exempt status if they breach 501(c)(3) duties to confer a public benefit.  
A. Property Rights in Dead Bodies 
The “no property” rule—a common law principle that no one has 
a property right of ownership in a dead body—developed in English 
 
 109. See David S. Goldberg et al., Deceased Organ Donation Consent Rates Among Racial and 
Ethnic Minorities and Older Potential Donors, 41 CRITICAL CARE MED. 496, 499 (2013).  
 110. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 309–10.  
 111. See Alexandra K. Glazier, Organ Donation and the Principles of Gift Law, 13 CLINICAL J. 
AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 1283, 1283 (2018) (“The UAGA establishes gift law as the central legal 
principle in the United States opt-in system of organ donation.”); Daniel G. Jardine, Comment, 
Liability Issues Arising out of Hospitals’ and Organ Procurement Organizations’ Rejection of Valid 
Anatomical Gifts: The Truth and Consequences, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1655, 1657, 1671. 
 112. See Alexandra K. Glazier, The Principles of Gift Law and the Regulation of Organ 
Donation, 24 TRANSPLANT INT’L 368, 368 (2011).  
 113. See Adherence to First Person Consent, NATCO (Nov. 2009), http://www.natco1.org/ 
Advocacy/files/First Person Consent.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDQ3-EW4K] [hereinafter NATCO 
Policy Statement].  
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common law.114 English common law, however, did recognize the right 
of a decedent’s executors to custody and possession of the body until its 
proper burial.115 Using English common law as a foundation, U.S. 
courts similarly adopted the no property rule and protected the family’s 
right of proper burial as a “quasi-property” right.116 This quasi-property 
right gives next of kin a cause of action against anyone who tortiously 
interferes with the burial and proper preservation of remains.117 But 
once buried, the next of kin loses any constitutionally protected 
property interest in the body.118 The phrase “quasi-property” is 
misleading, as it creates no real property rights and only has vague 
legal protections for both controlling the body for burial and preventing 
organ removal.119 
Some states have modified common law principles to recognize 
stronger property rights in dead bodies. For example, Texas has 
modified the common law to prioritize a decedent’s properly expressed 
wishes regarding burial instructions over the wishes of living 
individuals who have the right to control the disposition of the 
decedent’s remains.120 But there is no statutory penalty for failing to 
comply with the decedent’s wishes.121 Other “states recognize a 
legitimate claim of entitlement by the next of kin to possession of the 
remains . . . for burial or other lawful disposition” and permit next of 
kin to bring 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions arising from an “alleged 
deprivation of procedural due process with regard to such remains.”122  
To some extent, the UAGA itself morphed common law property 
principles concerning dead bodies. Although the Act does not grant to 
any person a property right in the donor’s dead body, it recognizes the 
OPO’s superior right to the body over the “limited privilege of the next 
 
 114. P.D.G. Skegg, Medical Uses of Corpses and the ‘No Property’ Rule, 32 MED. SCI. & L. 311, 
311–12, 314 (1992). It is unclear where this principle originated, with scholars speculating that 
the rule developed either as a result of dead bodies normally being subject to the control of the 
ecclesiastical courts or because judges believed that treating corpses as property would devalue 
them. Id. at 314. 
 115. Id. at 312.  
 116. 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 2 (2018). 
 117. Id.  
 118. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 5 (2013).  
 119. Bucklin, supra note 75, at 327 (“It seems reasonably obvious that the word ‘quasi-
property’ [was] something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that in reality the 
personal feelings of the survivors [were] being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one 
but a lawyer.” (alterations in original) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
TORTS § 12 (5th ed. 1984))). 
 120. Beyer, supra note 20 (manuscript at 8). 
 121. Id. (manuscript at 13).  
 122. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 4. Section 1983 actions are civil suits for the deprivation 
of rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
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of kin to later get the body for burial.”123 The law is currently too vague 
to determine the legal implications of not following this prescribed order 
of rights. For example, if a person violates the order, it is unclear what 
entity, if any, is entitled to sue. If the OPO gives up its superior interest, 
it is disregarding the decisions of both the donor and the potential 
donee,124 but neither individual is in a position to sue to enforce her 
rights. The decedent has no legal representative available to advocate 
for her rights, and the potential donee has no idea that her potentially 
lifesaving organ would be available but for the OPO’s refusal to procure 
it in violation of state law.  
B. Gift Law 
Gift law governs all anatomical donations in the United States125 
and derives from property law.126 “A ‘gift’ is a voluntary transfer of 
property by one person to another without any consideration or 
compensation therefor.”127 A “perfected,” or executed, gift has the same 
legal status as an executed contract if “founded upon the consent of the 
parties.”128 That is, the gift becomes legally enforceable. Three elements 
must be satisfied to constitute a legally enforceable gift: (1) donative 
intent, (2) transfer or delivery, and (3) acceptance.129  
Donative intent requires that the donee make the gift 
voluntarily and form “an affirmative objective to donate.”130 This legal 
requirement is satisfied through the “document of gift,” which is 
documentation that indicates the individual would like to consent to 
donate.131 Under the current U.S. “opt-in” or “explicit-consent” donor-
registration and donation system, an individual may document her 
consent to donate by signing a donor card—indicating such intent when 
she renews her license or registers online through her local OPO’s or 
state’s internet-based donor registry.132 
 
 123. Bucklin, supra note 75, at 333.  
 124. Id. at 342.  
 125. Legal Aspects of a Registered Donor: What You Need to Know, ALLIANCE (2017), 
https://organdonationalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CSuite-Snapshot-Fall-2017-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRQ3-LYK6].  
 126. Glazier, supra note 112, at 368.  
 127. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 1 (2010).  
 128. Id. § 2. 
 129. Glazier, supra note 112, at 368.  
 130. Id. at 369.  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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Transfer or delivery is the second step in perfecting a gift.133 
Delivery in the context of gift law may include manual delivery 
(physically transferring the property),134 constructive delivery 
(transferring a physical object that will give access to the property),135 
or symbolic delivery (transferring a symbol of the property to eventually 
be transferred, such as a written instrument).136 In the context of organ 
donation, symbolic delivery is satisfied when the OPO receives the 
electronic transmission or physical form indicating the donor’s intent to 
donate organs upon death.137  
Acceptance by the OPO is the final requirement to complete the 
legally enforceable gift, and the OPO accepts the gift by allowing the 
donor on the registry. The OPO, not the eventual donee, must accept 
the gift because under the UAGA, the OPO is the legal donee.138 
Therefore, the gifting of organs is completed before death and is legally 
enforceable upon the donor’s death, as long as she does not change her 
mind before being declared medically brain dead.139 OPOs that refuse 
to procure organs from a donor until the family consents are in the legal 
position of rejecting the gift and requesting the same gift again from the 
next of kin.140  
Symbolic delivery is the most appropriate delivery paradigm in 
the context of organ donations. One scholar has suggested the transfer 
element is satisfied through manual delivery when doctors transplant 
the organ into the body of the donee.141 This theory is incorrect; if 
transferring the organ into the donee’s body were the only way to satisfy 
the transfer requirement, the anatomical gift would not be legally 
 
 133. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 2, at 762 n.5 (“[D]elivery is the adrenaline that makes it a contract 
executed.”). 
 134. Id. § 19 (actual delivery is given when it is shown that the “owner parted with dominion 
and control over the gift”). 
 135. Id. § 21 (constructive delivery is given when, “in place of actual manual transfer, the 
donor delivers to the donee the means of obtaining possession and control of the subject matter or, 
in some other manner, relinquishes to the donee power and dominion over it”). 
 136. Id. (symbolic delivery is given when, “instead of the thing itself, some other object is 
handed over in its name and stead”).  
 137. Symbolic delivery is permitted when manual or constructive delivery is impossible. Id.  
 138. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 11(c)(3) (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 
2009) (“If the part is an organ and the gift is for the purpose of transplantation or therapy, the gift 
passes to the appropriate organ procurement organization as custodian of the organ.”).  
 139. Id. § 6(a) (describing the process of amending and revoking an anatomical gift as done 
before a donor’s death). 
 140. Bucklin, supra note 75, at 337–38.  
 141. Glazier, supra note 112, at 370 (identifying the transfer element of a gift as one that 
“involves the recovery of the donated organ and the delivery of the organ to the recipient”). 
Alexandra Glazier is the president and CEO of New England Donor Services, an affiliation 
between two OPOs. See Alexandra Glazier, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/alexandra-
glazier-914677 (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/42M3-JWVQ].  
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binding until after such a transfer. Thus, an OPO (and eventual 
transplant donee) would not have legal title to the organ until it had 
already been transplanted. This framework risks not fulfilling the 
donor’s wishes if the family is allowed to intervene and disrupt the 
donor’s intent. A manual delivery theory is incorrect also because it 
designates acceptance by the donee or donee’s surgeon as fulfilling the 
legal requirement of acceptance,142 whereas the UAGA states explicitly 
that the OPO is the legal donee of the organ.143  
C. The Current Lack of Enforcement of First-Person Authorization 
OPOs have employed diverse tactics to implement first-person-
authorization statutes—such as communicating to families their desire 
to honor the patient’s wishes rather than asking for consent144—but a 
significant number of registered donors’ wishes are still not followed. 
Not executing a donor’s gift is a violation of first-person-authorization 
statutes in every state; as of 2013, however, twenty percent of OPOs 
still had not procured an organ when the next of kin objected, and 
thirty-five percent reported they had yet to “proceed with organ 
procurement from a registered organ donor whose family objected to 
donation.”145 Fifteen percent of OPOs had not been presented with the 
dilemma and may still refuse to procure organs when confronted with 
family objections.146 
The acts of OPOs that refuse to honor first-person authorization 
are not only unethical147 but in express violation of section 8(a) of the 
2006 Revised Act. The ULC added section 8(a) in response to OPOs not 
 
 142. Glazier, supra note 112, at 370 (highlighting that the donee or the donee’s surgeon may 
accept the gift). 
 143. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 11(c)(3) (designating organ procurement 
organizations as custodians of the gifted organ); see also Bucklin, supra note 75, at 329 (declaring 
the OPO “the ‘donee’ of the gift from the donor”).  
 144. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 173. 
 145. Id. at 172–73; see also Casey Leins, Should the Government Decide if You’re an Organ 
Donor?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 12, 2016, 1:37 PM), www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-
02-12/presumed-consent-and-americas-organ-donor-shortage [https://perma.cc/5FHL-KVSW] 
(“[H]ealth care workers still don’t want to take organs without the family’s consent and don’t follow 
[first-person-authorization laws] in practice, says Arthur Caplan, director of the Division of 
Medical Ethics at the New York University Langone Medical Center.”). 
 146. Fifty-one OPOs reported that a registered donor’s family objects in less than ten percent 
of cases, six OPOs reported that a registered donor’s family objects in eleven to twenty-five percent 
of cases, and one OPO did not respond. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 172–74; see also Traino & 
Siminoff, supra note 61, at 296 (noting that while “some OPOs will uphold decedents’ wishes in 
the face of family dissent, others choose not to procure out of habit and/or to prevent negative 
publicity”). 
 147. See Chon et al., supra note 52, at 175.  
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in compliance with the 1987 UAGA,148 and the drafters specifically 
intended to clarify and address this problem.149 The ULC included in its 
notes to the 2006 Revised Act that seeking affirmation of a gift from the 
donor’s family could result in not only unnecessary delays in recovering 
the organs but also the reversal of the donor’s donation decision: 
Section 8 intentionally disempowers families from making or revoking anatomical gifts in 
contravention of a donor’s wishes. Thus, under the strengthened language of this [Act], if 
a donor had made an anatomical gift, there is no reason to seek consent from the donor’s 
family as they have no right to give it legally.150 
Involving families in the organ transplantation process is 
permissible,151 but allowing them to override the decedent’s wishes is 
not.  
NATCO, a trade group for transplant professionals, has 
announced its support for first-person authorization and the 2006 
Revised Act.152 But it mischaracterized the legal issue: NATCO 
recognized that “not accepting the donation from a clinically suitable 
donor is a violation” of the UAGA, but transplant professionals’ “[f]ears 
about litigation should be mitigated by” the good faith defense when 
they proceed with organ and tissue donations in the face of family 
objections.153 This statement correctly notes that transplant 
professionals should feel confident that they will be insulated from 
litigation when they act in good faith, but it fails to address OPOs’ legal 
obligations to procure donated organs. No OPO, transplant center, or 
doctor has been penalized to date for refusing to honor first-person 
authorization, which, in turn, creates a perverse incentive for OPOs and 
others involved in the donation process to keep discarding the express 
wishes of the decedent in exchange for the grieving family’s approval.154  
OPOs that do not procure organs over family objections cite 
potential lawsuits and negative publicity as the primary motivating 
 
 148. The 1987 UAGA included one provision that mandated OPOs follow first-person 
authorization. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987), amended by 
REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT. 
 149. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note.  
 150. Id. 
 151. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 175.  
152. NATCO Policy Statement, supra note 113.  
 153. Id. 
 154. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 147 n.20: 
After death, the rights of the intended recipient (if one exists) are to dominate the claims 
of all others under this law. Nonetheless, attending physicians routinely require 
permission from the patient’s family before removing the organs. . . . Such violations 
have gone unpunished to date, apparently because there is no identifiable plaintiff to 
enforce compliance.  
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factors in neglecting the donor’s wishes.155 Transplant professionals’ 
fear of potential lawsuits is based on a misinterpretation of the law, as 
not following the decedent’s wishes violates the 2006 Revised Act. Fear 
of negative publicity, however, may not be misplaced. Only once has an 
OPO filed suit to retrieve organs from a registered donor when the 
family vehemently objected,156 and the move came with significant 
backlash. Although the OPO won and procured the registered donor’s 
organs, the local media focused on the family’s grief and disbelief that 
doctors could take its son’s organs over its wishes.157 Given that OPOs 
are responsible for registering and educating the public in their regions 
and maintaining close working relationships with transplant centers,158 
it is unsurprising some will trade UAGA compliance for positive 
relationships with communities and hospitals. Thus, OPOs need 
stronger incentives to comply with first-person authorization while 
preserving positive relationships with health-care providers.  
D. 501(c)(3) Status and Obligations 
OPOs incorporate as nonprofit organizations in the state in 
which they are headquartered. A nonprofit, or 501(c)(3), organization 
enjoys tax-exempt status159 but must be organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, 
literary, or educational purposes, among others inapplicable in the 
organ-donation context.160 State nonprofit law governs nonprofits, 
which the state attorney general enforces. Typically, the state attorney 
general alone has the power to bring lawsuits to enforce compliance 
 
 155. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 176; NATCO Policy Statement, supra note 113. Some organ-
donation advocates argue that 
[s]ince most Americans approve of organ donation, it is difficult to imagine a 
newspaper’s editor siding with a next of kin who wants to prevent his deceased 
relative’s decision to make an organ donation. It is more likely that the newspaper 
would paint the next of kin as a person trying to frustrate a decedent’s dying wish and 
call the OPO a hero for implementing the moral act of the decedent. 
Bucklin, supra note 75, at 339–40 (footnote omitted).  
 156. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 173; Allison Manning, Family Loses Fight to Keep Son’s 
Organs from Donation, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 11, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/ 
content/stories/local/2013/07/11/Judge-ordered-family-to-let-brain-dead-son-donate-organs.html 
[https://perma.cc/EMJ3-EVLE] (describing the first time that Lifeline of Ohio, an organ 
procurement organization, went to court over a donation).  
 157. See Court: Man’s Organs Donated Despite Mom’s Plea, TIMESREPORTER.COM (July 12, 
2013, 12:01 PM), http://www.timesreporter.com/article/20130712/NEWS/307129861 
[https://perma.cc/AJ6K-WKAY]; Manning, supra note 156.  
158. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13; Howard et al., supra note 11, at 14. 
 159. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).  
 160. Id.  
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with 501(c)(3) because she “is the representative of the public in 
compelling the trustees to perform their duties properly.”161  
Section 501(c)(3) also requires that no part of the net earnings of 
the organization benefit any private shareholder or individual, no 
substantial part of the organization’s activities be devoted to attempts 
to influence legislation, and no part of the organization’s activities 
include participating in a political campaign on behalf of a candidate 
for public office.162 The U.S. Supreme Court has imposed another 
requirement for organizations to obtain and maintain tax-exempt 
status: they must serve a valid public purpose and confer a public 
benefit.163 A single substantial nonexempt purpose or payment will 
“destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of [the] 
truly [exempt] purposes” of the organization.164 In Bob Jones University 
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the IRS properly denied 
tax-exempt status to a nonprofit private school because its racially 
discriminatory admissions standards were “so at odds with the common 
community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might 
otherwise be conferred.”165  
Federal law requires OPOs to operate as nonprofit organizations 
that advance a scientific purpose.166 Specifically, they must identify 
potential organ donors within their service areas; conduct systematic 
efforts to acquire all usable organs from potential donors; arrange for 
the acquisition and preservation of donated organs and set quality 
standards for such a process; allocate donated organs equitably among 
transplant patients; provide or arrange for the transportation of 
donated organs to transplant centers; assist hospitals in establishing 
and implementing protocols for routine request; and fulfill other duties 
set forth by federal regulation.167 OPOs confer a public benefit by 
managing organ-procurement and allocation systems to facilitate organ 
donation within their geographic areas and by conducting public 
outreach to increase the number of registered donors and thus the 
number of lifesaving organ transplants performed each year.  
When an OPO does not comply with first-person-authorization 
legislation, it undermines the public benefit it purports to confer—and 
thus puts its nonprofit status in jeopardy. If the IRS were to revoke 
 
 161. MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: LAW AND TAXATION § 14:6 (2d ed. 
2018).  
 162. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); PHELAN, supra note 161, § 12:1. 
 163. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 589–91 (1983).  
 164. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).  
 165. 461 U.S. at 592.  
 166. 42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1)(A) (2012).  
 167. Id. § 273(b)(3).  
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nonprofit status, the OPO would face several consequences: losing 
eligibility to receive tax-deductible contributions, losing exempt status 
from federal income tax, becoming obligated to pay corporate income 
tax on annual revenue, and potentially being subjected to back taxes.168 
More importantly, the population the OPO serves would have to be 
absorbed by other OPOs. Even if the added population and donor 
numbers were proportional after absorption, other OPO 
responsibilities—such as educating the public in order to increase donor 
rates—would be spread more thinly, and at least in the interim, the 
same number of personnel would become responsible for coordinating 
more transplants.169 For example, the Iowa Donor Network, the OPO 
that serves the state of Iowa, is responsible for more than three million 
people.170 If it were to shut down, more than three million people would 
have to be absorbed by other OPOs, who would have to take on the 
responsibility for education efforts and coordination of transplants 
among this additional population. Also, the dissolution of an OPO could 
send a negative message to the public about the stability and 
importance of the organ-donation system—if the OPO in the area does 
not operate according to law, how can we trust other OPOs to follow the 
law?  
III. AMENDING THE UAGA ONCE MORE 
States spearheaded the movement toward improved 
coordination and regulation of the organ-donation process with the 
1968 UAGA; they should endeavor to regain their roles as the true 
regulators and enforcers in an effort to drive up the organ supply. 
Although the federal government largely regulates OPOs, they are 
incorporated under state law and should be held accountable to serve 
the taxpayers of the states that grant them 501(c)(3) status. State 
policies implemented during the past two decades to increase organ 
 
 168. See Revocation of Tax Exemption, NAT’L COUNCIL NONPROFITS, 
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/revocation-of-tax-exemption (last visited Jan. 
13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/49N2-D75F]; Revoked? Reinstated? Learn More, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/automatic-revocation-of-exemption (last updated Dec. 
13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/35JZ-HVQB].  
 169. See Howard et al., supra note 11, at 14 (describing the federal regulation imposed upon 
OPO operations that requires the use of “systematic efforts, including professional education, to 
acquire all usable organs from potential donors,” while noting that the decrease in the number of 
OPOs has been met with an increase in transplant centers).  
 170. SCI. REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS, IOWA DONOR NETWORK 7 (2018), 
https://www.srtr.org/document/pdf?fileName=%5C102018_release%5CpdfOSR%5CIAOPOP1XX2
01805P.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6LT-KYDB].  
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donation have had little to no effect.171 The first-person-authorization 
component of the 2006 Revised Act has made no significant impact on 
donation rates,172 and states must enforce their laws and closely 
monitor the organizations that are responsible for the transplant 
process—which involves life-and-death matters—within their juris-
dictions.  
Even if state attorneys general strictly enforced first-person 
authorization, they would not substantially close the gap between the 
numbers of organs available and patients on the waiting list.173 Federal 
regulation currently requires OPOs to meet specific performance 
standards,174 but simply raising such standards will not supply OPOs 
with adequate resources to increase the organ-donor pool. Thus, to 
significantly resolve the organ shortage, states should adopt a twofold 
solution by amending the UAGA to (1) switch the donation system to 
“presumed consent” but allow individuals to opt out of being an organ 
donor, either through online registries or while renewing their driver’s 
licenses, and (2) create a monitoring and enforcement mechanism for 
the new system within state health departments and offices of 
attorneys general. These amendments would essentially create a state 
statutory scheme that requires OPOs to procure organs of a decedent 
unless the individual expressed her wishes not to donate during her 
lifetime and excludes the next of kin from the process entirely. This type 
 
 171. See Paula Chatterjee et al., The Effect of State Policies on Organ Donation and 
Transplantation in the United States, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1323, 1327 (2015) (finding that 
the passage of revenue policies, “contributing to an additional 6.5 deceased donors and 8 
transplants from deceased donors per year for an average state,” had only a small effect); Satel & 
Cronin, supra note 7, at 1329 (examining six state-level policies from 1988 to 2010 and concluding 
that only a dedicated revenue stream for donor recruitment and promotion activities caused a 
“modest rise in the rate of transplants”). 
 172. Chatterjee et al., supra note 171, at 1326–27 (noting that “[f]irst-person consent laws,” 
among other efforts, “had no robust, significant association with either donation rates or number 
of transplants”). 
 173. See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 4 (stating that between thirteen thousand 
and twenty-nine thousand deaths occurred under circumstances that would allow for organ 
donation); Chon et al., supra note 52, at 172 (reporting that family objections only occur between 
ten and twenty-five percent of the time); Donors Exceeded 10,000, supra note 5 (stating that there 
were 10,281 deceased organ donors in 2017).  
 174. 42 C.F.R. § 486.318 (2018). Only nine to fourteen percent of OPOs 2009–11, however, 
were meeting the review criteria of the Scientific Registry, which bases its standards on observed 
yield and expected yield. Therefore, between eighty-six and ninety-one percent of OPOs were 
failing in all three areas of criteria: observed yield is at least ten percent lower than expected yield, 
observed yield per one hundred donors is at least ten less than expected yield per one hundred 
donors, and the observed yield is statistically significantly different than expected yield. David A. 
Zaun et al., Monitoring Performance of Organ Procurement Organization in the United States: 
Observed and Expected Donor Yield, SCI. REGISTRY TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS (2011), 
https://www.srtr.org/media/1103/atc2012_zaun.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6CF-N575]. 
Havekost_Galley (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  11:07 PM 
716 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2:691 
of system, termed a “hard opt-out” system, increased donation rates by 
twenty-five percent in Austria and Singapore.175  
A. A Presumed-Consent Model 
Enforcing first-person authorization in the current opt-in system 
will not be enough to combat the organ-donation shortage. In the last 
thirty years, the waiting list for an organ transplant has grown nearly 
eight-fold, from 15,029 people in 1988 to 113,737 as of February 2019,176 
while the number of donors has increased less than three-fold, from 
5,909 in 1988 to 16,473 in 2017.177 To address this disparity, individual 
states should adopt a presumed-consent model similar to those 
currently used in over twenty countries.178 This model could be termed, 
as one scholar suggested, “default to donation” rather than “presumed 
consent” to achieve greater public acceptance and not be viewed as the 
taking of individual rights.179 
1. Framing the Issue in Favor of Donation: Not So Radical After All? 
Switching to an “opt-out,” or presumed-consent model of 
donation, is not as radical or detrimental as some commentators 
suggest. In a study analyzing organ-recovery rates from twenty-two 
countries that do not require explicit consent, researchers found that 
these countries had approximately twenty-five to thirty percent higher 
recovery rates for deceased organ donors than countries with opt-in 
systems.180 There has been remarkably high and long-standing support 
 
 175. Organ Donation: Does an Opt-Out System Increase Transplants?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 10, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-41199918 [https://perma.cc/33A9-58RN]; see also What Is 
HOTA All About?, SING. GOV’T (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.gov.sg/factually/content/what-is-hota-
all-about [https://perma.cc/7GNX-Z4Y9] (explaining Singapore’s organ-donation system).  
 176. Transplant Trends, supra note 6; U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ethics of 
Deceased Organ Donor Recovery, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/ethics-of-deceased-organ-donor-recovery (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3GVV-3R8X] [hereinafter Ethics of Deceased Organ Donor 
Recovery].  
 177. Total Number of Organ Donors in the United States from 1988 to 2018, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/398384/total-number-of-us-organ-donors/ (last visited Jan. 31, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/25MN-E2TG]. 
 178. See Ethics of Deceased Organ Donor Recovery, supra note 176. 
 179. See Leins, supra note 145.  
 180. Ethics of Deceased Organ Donor Recovery, supra note 176; see also Shai Davidai et al., 
The Meaning of Default Options for Potential Organ Donors, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 
15201, 15201 (2012) (noting the difference in average organ-donation rates between opt-in 
countries (less than fifteen-percent participation) and opt-out countries (more than ninety-percent 
participation) and attributing it to “the difference in relative effort and initiative required for 
participation”); Lee Shepherd et al., An International Comparison of Deceased and Living Organ 
Donation/Transplant Rates in Opt-In and Opt-Out Systems: A Panel Study, 12 BMC MED. 131 
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for organ donation by the general public, but the rate of organ-donor 
registration has remained low.181 In one survey, HHS found that about 
half of Americans explicitly stated they would support an opt-out 
system.182 Instead of drivers being asked to check a box to become an 
organ donor, they would be asked to check a box if they would prefer 
not to become an organ donor. This model returns higher rates of 
donation, social psychologists have theorized, because when faced with 
difficult decisions, people tend to avoid making a choice and instead 
prefer to follow the default option.183  
Another study found that the type of system (opt in or opt out) 
causes large differences in the meaning that individuals attach to 
participation.184 Participants asked to think about a country with an 
opt-in policy judged organ donation to be on par with highly meaningful 
and significant prosocial behaviors, such as giving away half of one’s 
wealth to charity upon death, and almost equivalent to going on a 
hunger strike to advocate for a cause.185 In contrast, participants asked 
to think about a country with an opt-out policy judged organ donation 
to be on par with prosocial behaviors that were relatively lower in 
meaningfulness and significance, such as letting others go ahead in line 
and volunteering to help the poor.186 The study ultimately concluded 
not only that procrastination and laziness are factors contributing to 
individuals’ failures to register in opt-in countries but also that 
 
(2014) (analyzing data from forty-eight countries, including opt-in countries, and finding similar 
results and that higher rates are a direct cause of the opt-out systems).  
 181. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 172. As of 2016, ninety-five percent of Americans support 
organ donation, and sixty percent who have not signed up to be an organ donor would be willing 
to do so. See Leins, supra note 145. This is an increase from the eighty-five percent of Americans 
who supported organ donation in 1993 and the seventy-five percent who supported the practice in 
1985. Identification of Potential Organ, Tissue, and Eye Donors, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,856, 33,857 (June 
22, 1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 482) (citing a 1993 Gallup poll); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT 
ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987), amended by REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT 
(2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009) (citing a 1985 Gallup poll).  
 182. Leins, supra note 145. Contra Ethics of Deceased Organ Donor Recovery, supra note 176 
(“A deceased organ recovery model that does not require explicit consent would not gain sufficient 
support in the US to merit a policy change.”). 
 183. See Dan Ariely, Are We in Control of Our Own Decisions?, TED (Dec. 2008), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/dan_ariely_asks_are_we_in_control_of_our_own_decisions 
[https://perma.cc/E3JZ-KHS7] (asserting that the reason countries with default organ-donation 
systems have higher rates of organ donation is that individuals tend to choose the default option 
when confronted with complicated decisions). This study is supported by data finding that 
mandatory-consent systems return much lower registration rates than expected. A mandatory-
consent system forces individuals to choose, “Yes, I want to be a donor,” or, “No, not at this time.” 
A popular theory explains that this behavior is due to people feeling uncomfortable thinking about 
the ends of their lives and, when forced to make a choice, picking whichever choice does not force 
them to consider their demise. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 13–14).  
 184. Davidai et al., supra note 180, at 15203.  
 185. Id. 
 186. Id.  
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“[p]articipation or nonparticipation . . . is heavily influenced by the 
meaning that people individually and collectively attach to the opt-in or 
opt-out choice in question.”187  
2. An Answer to the Question of Donative Intent 
Families often claim a lack of knowledge of the decedent’s 
donation preferences as a significant reason for refusing donation. Some 
families report that they interpret an undesignated donation status on 
a driver’s license or lack of registration as a clear indication that the 
decedent had previously declined donation rather than an indication 
that the decedent was undecided.188 Operating in a presumed-consent 
system would put families on notice that unless the decedent made the 
express choice to opt out, she intended to donate her organs. There 
would be no question regarding whether the decedent would have been 
okay with donating; if the idea of donation ran counter to her religious 
beliefs or morals or otherwise concerned her, she would have opted out.  
The presumed-consent model would also more fully honor 
decedents’ quasi-property rights than the current model. Gift law189 
currently infers donative intent from the affirmative decision to register 
to be an organ donor. Under a presumed-consent model, the donative 
intent is suddenly murkier: Did the decedent affirmatively intend to 
donate her organs, or did she forget to opt out? If she merely forgot to 
opt out, are her quasi-property rights in her own body now violated?190 
This potential violation of rights is the same issue that occurs in the 
current system when OPOs refuse to follow first-person authorization; 
individual preferences on how a body is used posthumously are 
discarded in place of the family’s or doctor’s judgment of what the 
individual should have wanted. Often, in situations when a family 
objects and overrides a decedent’s preference for organ donation, it is 
not thinking about what the decedent wanted but what it wants in its 
immense time of grief.191  
Ninety-five percent of adults in the United States currently 
support organ donation,192 and sixty percent of those who have not 
registered are willing to do so.193 While fifty-four percent of the adult 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 13).  
 189. See supra Section II.B. 
 190. See Ethics of Deceased Organ Donor Recovery, supra note 176 (explaining a major 
criticism of the presumed-consent model is that if the decedent forgot to opt out, her individual 
rights would be violated).  
 191. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 311–12.  
 192. Organ Donation Statistics, supra note 66.  
 193. Leins, supra note 145.  
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population is already registered, approximately another twenty-seven 
percent of the population would also prefer to donate.194 This means 
that 81.6 percent of the adult population in the United States likely 
wants to become organ donors.195 Ethicists have argued that this is not 
nearly high enough to justify a presumed-consent model—this would 
indeed not be high enough if every person, regardless of preferences, 
had to donate and there was no ability to opt out.196 But under the 
presumed-consent model this Note proposes, the ability to opt out is 
kept intact. Thus, by presuming consent, more decedents would have 
their quasi-property rights honored than in an opt-in model.  
Moreover, OPOs and transplant centers could institute the 
routine inquiry requirement proposed in the 1987 UAGA197—asking 
every patient during admittance to the hospital whether she would or 
would not like to be an organ donor—which would serve as another 
filter to document objections long before either the hospital or patient 
must make the donation decision. 
3. The United States’ Previous Brush with Presumed Consent: Why 
This Time Is Different 
A new presumed-consent system would address the problems 
that triggered the Sixth and Ninth Circuit cases that led to the 
dissolution of the state-driven opt-out system in the United States, 
discussed in Section I.B.3. Under the new system, a consolidated, online 
registry would hold objections—the same type currently used, but with 
the names of individuals who opt out of donating their organs. There 
would be no ability for hospital or OPO personnel to blind themselves 
to a patient’s objection, as in Brotherton and Newman. Instead, to 
retrieve and transplant organs, the system would have to be checked, 
and whether the patient had registered her preference not to donate 
would have to appear on the death certificate. With technological 
advances, a phone call or fax has become a click of a button, making for 
a much more streamlined and easy-to-access objections database. 
Besides, procurements would occur in hospitals where patients die, 
providing more oversight than remote, disconnected locations run by 
 
194. Forty-six percent of the adult population is not registered to donate, but sixty percent of 
that population would like to register. See Organ Donation Statistics, supra note 66 (stating fifty-
four percent of the U.S. adult population is registered to donate). Thus, the percentage of the 
population that is unregistered but wishes to donate is 27.6 percent (46% × 60% = 27.6%).  
195. This estimate comes from the sum of the registered donor population (fifty-four percent) 
and the population of unregistered donors who would like to donate (27.6 percent).  
 196. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 176.  
 197. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987), amended by REVISED 
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009); see supra note 106.  
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individual doctors. Most importantly, no financial incentive to procure 
more organs would exist, because all organs would be directly gifted to 
an OPO and used for transplantation. Organs could only be sold if 
doctors successfully harvested them in the hospital without detection, 
smuggled them out of the hospital, and auctioned them on the black 
market—the same extreme (but unlikely) threat that exists in the 
current opt-in system.  
Most significantly, the presumed-consent system this Note 
proposes would create a hard opt-out policy198 rather than the soft opt-
out policy199 previously implemented. Empowering state attorneys 
general to sue OPOs that do not follow first-person authorization for 
breaching 501(c)(3) status creates a hard opt-out policy and is necessary 
because “a key reason why organs are not obtained after a person’s 
death is the unwillingness of family members to give consent”200 when 
donative intentions are unknown. This failure to follow first-person 
authorization was a central flaw in the implementation of the brief, ill-
regulated presumed-consent system used by states in the 1960s.201  
B. A Monitoring and Enforcement Mechanism 
Transitioning from an opt-in to opt-out presumption in favor of 
donation will not eradicate the issue of OPOs’ failure to follow first-
person authorization. Individual autonomy to choose organ donation is 
at the centerpiece of state organ-donation legislation yet is not 
consistently followed—OPOs have neither the motivation nor tools to 
enforce a decedent’s wishes, and a presumed-consent policy will not 
necessarily change this. The first-person-authorization problem 
presents itself differently in a presumed-consent system: an individual 
chooses not to opt out and fails to communicate her intentions,202 and 
the family objects to the procurement of her organs when she dies.  
Section 12(c) of the 2006 Revised Act allows for administrative 
sanctions for failing to abide by the statute, but there is no record of any 
OPO official receiving administrative sanctions for failing to follow 
first-person authorization. OPOs impose the administrative sanctions 
themselves, and states do not monitor or oversee OPOs’ compliance 
with the UAGA on a case-by-case basis.203 The only evidence that OPOs 
 
 198. Consent for Organ Donation, IR. DEP’T HEALTH, http://health.gov.ie/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/04/consentoptions.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9MPA-AVAY].  
 199. Id. 
 200. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 309.  
 201. Id. at 309–10. 
 202. Id. at 311.  
 203. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 12(c) (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009).  
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do not follow first-person authorization is anecdotal204 and by 
anonymous self-reporting.205 States need to create a monitoring and 
enforcement mechanism to remedy this oversight. This can be 
accomplished efficiently by amending the UAGA to require OPO bylaws 
to include a provision mandating that the OPO always follow first-
person authorization. Any violation of such a provision would constitute 
a breach of the OPO’s purpose to confer a public benefit,206 thus 
providing grounds for revoking its 501(c)(3) status under state law. The 
new provision would delegate the task of monitoring OPOs’ compliance 
to state health departments and empower state attorneys general to sue 
OPOs in breach of their 501(c)(3) statuses, the current enforcement 
mechanism for nearly all breaches of nonprofit status.207 
1. State Attorneys General Enforce OPOs’ 501(c)(3) Statuses 
Currently, there appears to be no standard set of bylaws for 
OPOs mandated by federal regulation or state law. OPOs must meet 
performance standards set by federal regulation208 and abide by 
applicable state laws as incorporated nonprofits, which includes first-
person authorization statutes. But OPOs may currently ignore first-
person authorization without repercussion. The UAGA should be 
amended to include a provision requiring a mandatory bylaw for all 
OPOs, such as the following: “The OPO shall abide by all provisions of 
the [name of the state statute adopting the UAGA], including first-
person authorization, which forbids OPO personnel to allow next of kin 
to override the decedent’s decision to donate.” Another provision should 
address the effect of the earlier provision, such as this example: “An 
OPO’s failure to strictly follow all bylaws of the OPO will be considered 
a breach of the nonprofit’s duty to confer a public benefit.” The second 
provision is necessary to give state attorneys general sufficient grounds 
to argue that even one breach of first-person authorization provides a 
sufficient basis to sue. Most litigation regarding breaches of purpose 
and revocation of 501(c)(3) status is based on a substantial deviation 
from an organization’s broader stated purpose,209 so courts may decide 
one breach is not sufficient to consider revocation of 501(c)(3) status. To 
avoid this problem, this proposed provision makes clear that one breach 
is sufficient for OPOs to lose their nonprofit statuses or face other 
 
 204. See Leins, supra note 145.  
 205. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 173.  
 206. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983).  
 207. PHELAN, supra note 161, § 14:6. 
 208. 42 C.F.R. § 486.318 (2018).  
 209. PHELAN, supra note 161, § 12:1.  
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sanctions. Also, this interpretation of a breach for purposes of 
revocation of nonprofit status would be limited narrowly to the organ-
donation and OPO context and thus is inapplicable to other types of 
nonprofits. These amendments to the UAGA would therefore not 
disrupt the operations and expectations of other nonprofits.  
Under these amendments, an OPO could not invoke the good 
faith defense in response to such a suit, because a conscious decision 
not to follow the law cannot be considered an attempt to act in good 
faith. The good faith defense is designed for situations in which 
transplant professionals mistakenly remove an organ without 
consent210 but were acting in good faith “in accordance” with the law. 
Under the amended statute, refusing to procure organs over family 
objections would not be acting “in accordance” with the law, and the 
good faith defense would not apply. This is arguably already true under 
the 2006 Revised Act,211 but because no plaintiff exists to represent the 
rights of potential donees, no situation has ever arisen in which a 
plaintiff could rebut the defense in this manner.212 Additionally, the 
good faith defense only immunizes medical professionals from suits by 
donors’ next of kin, not suits brought by another party on behalf of 
potential donees—the attorney general under the amended statute.213 
A breach of 501(c)(3) status is the best theory of liability under 
which to sue OPOs, as the law tasks the state attorney general with 
representing all citizens, and nonprofits receive benefits from 
taxpayers. A noncompliant OPO is detrimental not just to patients on 
the waiting list but also to the general public. The existence of a well-
functioning and successful OPO is a public health concern that affects 
not only those in need of a transplant but their families, employers, and 
insurance companies, as well as taxpayers who may contribute to their 
treatment until an organ is available.214 
Multiple sources have advocated for class actions on behalf of 
individuals on the transplant list, which would sue OPOs under 
negligence, tortious interference with contract, breach of contract, and 
 
 210. See Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 668–69 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) 
(upholding good faith defense against liability when bone was harvested mistakenly).  
 211. See Bucklin, supra note 75, at 338 (arguing that UAGA does not intend for OPOs to 
decline valid gifts due to family objections). 
 212. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 45–50, 147 n.20.  
 213. Jardine, supra note 111, at 1664.  
 214. For example, “the net welfare gain for society over the lifetime of a kidney recipient” is 
$1,132,000 per patient. P.J. Held et al., A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Government Compensation of 
Kidney Donors, 16 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 877, 880 (2016) (analyzing the net costs to society 
when patients receive a kidney transplant rather than stay on dialysis).  
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violation of civil rights theories of liability.215 These strategies are 
impractical and perhaps impossible. First, the public does not and 
should not have adequate access to information that would support 
these theories of liability.216 Second, although the fifty-eight OPOs have 
exclusive jurisdiction and responsibility for their territories, not all 
patients in need of an organ will receive one from their region’s OPO.217 
UNOS allocates organs based on many factors, and organs can be 
procured within one OPO’s jurisdiction and transported to another’s.218  
In assessing which plaintiffs are eligible to join a suit against an 
OPO in violation of first-person authorization, would it be only those 
patients within the OPO’s jurisdiction? Patients in the region who could 
have received an organ from the OPO? All patients on the national 
waiting list, exposing a single OPO to liability so large as to cover every 
patient that died while waiting for a transplant? Additionally, an OPO’s 
failure to follow state law does not technically wrong patients still 
waiting for a transplant—the estates of those who died while waiting 
for a transplant are entitled to a remedy. Under the new presumed-
consent model, it is imperative that a party representing the rights of 
all citizens has standing to sue. A doctor or OPO that procures organs 
over a decedent’s documented objection (registration on the opt-out list) 
should also be held accountable by the state attorney general for 
violating first-person authorization.  
2. State Health Departments Monitor OPOs 
The UAGA should also be amended to task the state health 
department with monitoring the OPO that serves its population and 
require that the state health department refer all potential violations 
to the state attorney general for investigation. State governments 
usually task their respective health departments with monitoring 
health-care services provided by the private sector and improving the 
adequacy and availability of health-care resources within the state.219 
The adequacy and availability of organs for transplants within the state 
 
 215. See Bucklin, supra note 75, at 339, 342–48 (addressing possible causes of action); Jardine, 
supra note 111, at 1667–80 (analyzing a potential negligence action).  
 216. See infra Section III.B.2.  
 217. A recipient’s distance from the donor hospital is a consideration for all types of organ 
transplants, but some organs (e.g., the pancreas and kidneys) can be preserved outside the human 
body longer than others, and thus those organs can travel longer distances. Other factors are also 
considered when UNOS determines allocation. How Organs Are Matched, UNOS, https://unos.org/ 
transplantation/matching-organs/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/L2EC-UZEA]. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Eileen Salinsky, Governmental Public Health: An Overview of State and Local Public 
Health Agencies, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y F. 13–14 (Aug. 18, 2010), https://www.nhpf.org/library/ 
background-papers/BP77_GovPublicHealth_08-18-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LHZ-GC7V]. 
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is a critical public health concern, and state health agencies have the 
experience and expertise to monitor and improve OPO performance. 
Donor registries are managed at the state level,220 and states already 
collect death certificates from patients who are declared dead at 
hospitals.221 State health departments can compare these two lists with 
data from OPOs and hospitals on the organs that were procured for 
transplants and determine whether OPOs followed first-person 
authorization by procuring organs from each person not on the opt-out 
list (and those with organs unsuitable for transplantation). Such a case-
by-case comparison requires access to both the donor registry and death 
certificates, and therefore it would be impossible for a class of plaintiffs 
representing patients on the waiting list to prove an OPO refused 
anatomical gifts.  
State health departments have the expertise to assist OPOs 
when families object to organ procurement and can assist in training 
OPOs and hospital personnel regarding their legal responsibilities.222 
In difficult cases, a state health-department official can speak with the 
family and explain the importance of the donation and the legal 
ramifications for the OPO if it refuses to comply with the law. This 
counseling would also ease relations with the OPO and the hospital in 
the wake of enacting an amended UAGA; decedents’ families would 
view the state health department’s lawyers as distinct from the hospital 
and their loved one’s care. It is important to separate the appearance of 
conflicting interests,223 and separating the interests of attorneys (the 
hospital’s versus the health department’s) could further reinforce the 
family’s faith that the decedent is being declared dead not to procure 
her organs but because she is medically deceased.224  
CONCLUSION 
 Increasingly sophisticated organ-transplantation technology 
brings with it the ability to save thousands of lives in the United States 
 
 220. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Organ Donation FAQs, ORGANDONOR.GOV, 
https://www.organdonor.gov/about/facts-terms/donation-faqs.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/W8U3-99ZF].  
 221. See Documenting Death—The Certificate, PBS (Feb. 1, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/pages/frontline/post-mortem/things-to-know/death-certificates.html [https://perma.cc/7J8B-
GMCW] (stating that most states utilize the U.S. Standard Death Certificate).  
 222. See Salinsky, supra note 219, at 11–15 (describing the array of regulatory and 
administrative functions performed by state health agencies).  
 223. See Donation Process, supra note 23 (noting that hospital staff is completely separate 
from transplant team).  
 224. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 296–97 (noting a popular fear that doctors will declare 
patients dead just to harvest their organs).  
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each year, but absent significant changes in legislation, the public will 
never benefit from this improvement. States initially led the movement 
to regulate the organ-donation process and should now reemerge as the 
leaders in organ-donation policy reform. Current law gives states the 
ability to both monitor and enforce the organizations responsible for the 
success of organ donation within their jurisdictions, and a policy switch 
to presumed consent would further ensure that hospitals and OPOs 
follow donative intent. States should adopt a twofold solution by 
amending the UAGA: first, changing the default presumption of 
donative intent to presumed consent, and second, requiring state health 
departments to monitor their respective OPOs and refer breaches of 
nonprofit obligations to state attorneys general for enforcement. Now is 
the time for states to give waiting patients another chance at life before 
the game is over.  
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